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This essay seeks to examine the most common factors that contribute to the varying 
degrees of liberal policies for the member states of the European Union (E.U.) regarding 
immigration issues. Additionally, it will expand on this topic and further study why some 
member states accept and grant asylum to significantly more immigrants than others. Secondly, 
it will look at how the political and ideological diversity within the E.U. affect the union, as well 
as E.U. policy and legislation regarding immigration. Hence, it seeks to determine whether the 
E.U.  is becoming more or less liberal when it comes to these issues. Finally, it will try to answer 
the question of whether the E.U., considering its immigration problems, should continue with its 
open border policy for immigrants coming from outside the union and open its borders, or if it 
should impose more restrictive border controls.  
 The E.U. seeks to be a liberal community, and therefore this paper will view these 
questions from a liberal perspective through the lens of the classical liberal theories of John 
Locke, as well as contemporary theories of the likes of Joseph Carens, John Rawls, and Robert 
Nozick. This paper will also compare and contrast the liberal arguments for open borders and 
border controls. Additionally, this paper will examine possible results from border controls and 
open border policies. To tie these issues together, this paper will provide an overview of the 
problems that arise for the E.U. and its immigrants who increasingly tend to come from non-
liberal countries.  
Expected Results and Conclusions 
 With the enormous influx of non-European immigrants mainly coming from Muslim 
countries, one could make the argument that the policies of  E.U. member states will become 
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more polarized. The eastern countries that do not have the same experience as western countries 
when it comes to dealing with immigration will continue to protest liberal immigration policies. 
At the same time, one could contend that the pro-immigration movement within the E.U. will 
become even fiercer, promoting even more liberal immigration policies. Additionally, with the 
cultural clash between the native population and the Muslim population already evident within 
many E.U. member states, policies for the new Muslim immigrants will be somewhat illiberal.  
In order to preserve liberal values, European states will continue to resort to illiberal 
means to achieve the preservation of liberal values. Thus, a purely liberal E.U. does not lie in the 
near future, and the E.U. will only achieve liberality if it can solve its internal political problems, 
as well as diminish the cultural and social differences between the native population and the 
Muslim population. Considering this, more restrictive border controls at the E.U.’s external 
borders as well as at the borders of the individual member states lies in the near future of the 
European Union.  
Literature Review: Liberal Theories Supporting Free Migration 
 When analyzing liberalism in foreign policy, it is important to remember that liberalism 
is in essence a domestic policy. It builds upon the centrality of basic individual rights, private 
property, and representative government, which derives largely from the classical liberal theories 
of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes (Doyle 2008, 59-61). According to Locke, the state is 
essentially a pragmatic arrangement designed to protect individuals in their private pursuits and 
prevent conflicts among them from erupting into violence. Both Locke and Hobbes agreed that 
people do not unite under a government to fill their lives with a new purpose; they unite under a 
government that can protect their individual rights so that they can pursue the goals they had 
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before they entered the state (Rapaczynski 1987, 118). One can interpret this as an argument for 
open borders and free migration. 
 One fierce proponent of open borders, Joseph Carens, uses the contemporary theories of 
Nozick and Rawls to support this argument for unrestricted borders (Meilaender 1999, 1062). 
Nozick himself quotes Locke and his “state of nature” in which individuals are in “a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think 
fit” (Nozick 1974, 10). In this state of nature, Carens argues that the function of the state is solely 
to enforce the rights of the individuals who are residing within a certain territory.  However, 
prohibiting people from entering this territory just because it is not the land of their birth is no 
part of the state’s legitimate mandate (Meilaender 1999, 1063).  
 When formulating this argument using Rawls’ theory, Carens uses the concept of the 
original position and the veil of ignorance that Rawls developed (Meilaender 1999, 1063). 
Reviving the notion of a social contract, Rawls argues that justice consists of the basic principles 
of government that free and rational individuals would agree to in a hypothetical situation of 
perfect equality. A situation in which a group of individuals are ignorant of their social, 
economic, and historical circumstances provides a basis for the concept of the original position 
and the veil of ignorance. This concept also includes their basic values and goals, including their 
conception of what constitutes a ‘good life.’ Rawls argues that by being ignorant of their own 
position and opportunities in society and life, these individuals would come to the conclusion 
that they all have the equal rights and opportunities necessary in order to achieve their goals in 
life, regardless of their current social situation (Duignan 2014).  
 Although Rawls himself assumed a closed society for the purposes of his theory, Carens 
argues that it is equally useful for thinking about international justice. In an international system, 
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one can argue that behind the veil of ignorance one would imagine a world with open borders for 
the reason that one’s birthplace can have a great impact on one’s opportunities in life. Therefore, 
in order to secure free movement, which might prove essential to one’s life plans, a person under 
the veil of ignorance would promote open borders (Meilaender 1999, 1063).  
Literature Review: Liberal Theories Supporting Restricted Immigration 
Carens provides some arguments for limited immigration within his liberal framework.  
He argues that a state can impose restrictions on comparably situated liberal egalitarian states. 
The principle of collective responsibility provides a basis for Carens’ argument, and he argues 
that equally prosperous communities that satisfy minimum standards of welfare provision for 
their citizens may legitimately restrict immigration from one another. These states may offer its 
citizens varying levels of welfare support, and unlimited immigration may undermine their 
ability to do so more generously.  One can use the principle of collective responsibility as an 
argument for the idea that these similarly liberal communities should take responsibility for their 
own members and provide them with the levels of welfare that they choose. In other words, 
states can reasonably impose restrictions on immigration from other states that are sufficiently 
liberal (Meilaender 1999, 1066).  
John Isbister argues against Carens, claiming that there are additional liberal arguments 
for border controls. His arguments are consistent with the liberal notion of each person’s equal 
moral standing in the world, and they stay away from arguments about the primacy of 
community and culture, in contrast to some non-liberal defenses of immigration controls. His 
main arguments center around two ideas: 1) that a country meeting the needs of its own 
disadvantaged citizens before the needs of disadvantaged foreigners is justifiable, and 2) that 
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unlimited immigration poses a threat to the most disadvantaged residents of rich countries 
(Isbister 2000, 632-634).  
Isbister argues that agreeing with the notion of the equal moral worth of all people does 
not necessarily commit us to the equal treatment of all people. He makes a comparison between 
one’s family and people outside of family, expecting that we give enormously more attention to 
kin than we do to others. However, by doing so, we do not imply that our relatives are morally 
superior to other people. Isbister further argues in accordance with this theory that it might be 
morally acceptable to think of one’s country as an extended family. Then, a government offering 
preferred treatment to people inside its borders while still recognizing the equal moral standing 
of those outside is justifiable (Isbister 2000, 630).  
Carens argues that border restrictions represent selfishness, and that “restrictions on 
migration usually serve as a protection for economic and political privilege” (Meilander 1999, 
1063).  Isbister agrees with this, arguing that this reason for border controls fails any reasonable 
liberal test of justice. However, he also argues that border controls can serve the cause of justice 
in at least one dimension. Even in rich countries there are poor people, and an uncontrolled 
influx of poor people from the third world might make the condition of the poor in rich countries 
much worse, as the immigrants might compete for jobs and lower wages. This argument supports 
Carens’ first point, in which he argues that giving preferred treatment to people inside a 
government’s borders because they are essentially an extended family is justifiable (Isbister 





This section seeks to provide background information about the current situation in the 
E.U. pertaining to migration and immigration policies and issues. It explains why the study of 
this topic is highly relevant today.  
Multiple western European nations founded the E.U.’s predecessor, the Coal and Steel 
Community, in 1950 based on the liberal theory that interdependence between states is an 
efficient means to avoid war (The History of the European Union 2015). Additionally, the 1985 
Schengen Agreement that took effect in 1995 abolished the E.U.’s internal borders and enabled 
passport-free movement across the bloc. Today, the Schengen Area consists of twenty-two out of 
the E.U.’s twenty-eight members, and also includes non-members Switzerland, Norway, and 
Iceland (Peter 2015). These policies of free movement are very much compatible with the 
classical liberal theories of Locke, as well as the contemporary theories of Nozick and Carens.  
However, the varying degrees of liberal policies of the member states pose serious challenges to 
the E.U.  This challenge is most evident today with the enormous influx of immigrants to the 
union and the rise of right-populist, anti-immigration parties all across the E.U. Thus, the E.U. is 
internally liberal when it comes to migration, but when it comes to immigration into the union, 
some member states are anything but liberal.  
The results of the 2014 European Parliament election show that the most dominant 
coalition, with almost thirty percent of the seats in parliament, is the Group of European People’s 
Party, which is Christian democratic, and conservative in its politics and ideology (Results of the 
2014 European Elections 2014). When the parliament passed a number of migration and 
immigration related bills in the early 2000s, this group voted more conservatively than any other 
political group in the parliament. Nevertheless, the E.U. passed six bills of quite liberal character, 
among which were two that dealt with the equal treatment of persons on racial and ethnic 
7 
 
grounds, as well as third-country nationals’ rights to full family reunification (Hix 2007, 182-
205).  
 Under the current crisis, it is clear that eastern countries are the most resistant to 
immigration. In the 2014 election, twelve out of Hungary’s total of twenty-one seats in 
parliament went to the Group of European People’s Party.  Most seats also went to this party in 
Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. All these countries belong to the 
eastern bloc of the E.U. (Results of the 2014 European Elections 2014).  
Numbers prove that these states are the ones generally accepting the smallest number of 
immigrants, and there is a striking difference in their acceptance rate compared to other 
countries. Both Sweden, a western country, and Hungary, an eastern country, have populations 
around ten million; therefore this paper uses them for the purposes of comparison. . In 2014, 
Sweden granted a little over thirty thousand immigrants asylum, which was around seventy-six 
point six percent of the total number of applicants. This is the second highest rate in all of E.U.  
Only Germany boasts higher numbers. When it comes to immigrants per capita, Sweden ranks 
number one, accepting three hundred seventeen point eight immigrants per one hundred 
thousand members of the population. Quite differently, Hungary accepts fewer than ten 
immigrants per one hundred thousand of the population, and only nine point four percent of all 
applicants get accepted (Europe’s Migrant Acceptance Rates 2015). 
According to the Dublin Regulation, the country an asylum seeker first enters is 
responsible for registering the asylum seeker and taking fingerprints, with a few exceptions such 
as those who seek to reunite with their families. Naturally, most of the asylum seekers first set 
foot in one of the eastern European countries, swamping countries such as Greece and Hungary 
with migrants.  They are finding it difficult to handle the situation. Additionally, under the 
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Dublin Regulation, there exists the Dublin transfer, through which a nation can send a migrant 
who has travelled to another country other than the country of registration back to the country of 
registration (Lyons 2015). Hungary unilaterally stopped accepting these transfers in June 2015 
and is building a wall along the Serbian border to stop more immigrants from coming into the 
country and into the Schengen area (Lyons 2015; Freeman 2015).  
Additionally, there is a strong sentiment in many European countries, especially eastern 
countries like Hungary, that multiculturalism is not desirable. There is a strong fear found all 
over Europe that ‘islamization’ is a threat to ‘Christian Europe’ and that the immigrants are an 
economic burden rather than an asset (Freeman 2015). 
 Evidently, the situation is very complex, and there is no easy answer to the problems 
facing the E.U.  Because the E.U. binds diverse member countries together both legally and 
economically, ideological clashes between members of the E.U. have intensified.  The states 
promoting free movement want to offer people from states with oppressive regimes refuge, and 
see Europe and the E.U. as a liberal community that wants to inspire liberalism all over the 
globe. Offering refuge to oppressed people is one way of achieving this goal. The states that do 
not wish to accept migrants, or only a limited amount of migrants, can argue that nonintervention 
is an equally important part of liberalism because it relies on respect for the rights of individuals 
to establish their own way of life free from foreign interference. Therefore, the E.U. should not 
force nations to accept immigrants if they wish not to do so (Doyle 2008, 67).  
However, with the current E.U. legal framework in place, it will be difficult for these 
states to maintain their policies regarding these issues. Nevertheless, this puts the E.U. in a 
precarious situation.  The E.U. therefore proposed a quota system to prevent a few states from 
carrying the full burden of immigration into the union.  Most member states accepted this 
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system. The states that did not accept the quota, among which are Hungary and Slovakia, are 
arguing from the liberal perspective of nonintervention.  The spokesperson of the Hungarian 
prime minister recently stated with regards to the quota system,  “…we would like to deal with 
our problems in a way that suits us” (Freeman 2015).  
Part III 
E.U. Legislation and Member State Legislation Regarding Immigration 
 Member states expressed reluctance at the prospect of giving up their national 
competence on immigration and border issues.  Up until 1999, member states handled 
immigration and asylum issues as stated in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar, and 
operated on an intergovernmental basis. However, in 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, visas, 
asylum, immigration, and other policies relating to the free movement of all persons, including 
third-country nationals, moved under the jurisdiction of the European Community Treaty. Thus, 
these issues went from an intergovernmental approach to a common approach (Adam 2009, 19).  
Since 1999, the E.U. has developed this common immigration policy and has agreed that 
the E.U. should have E.U.-wide immigration and visa rules valid throughout the E.U. (EU 
Immigration Portal: Explaining the Rules 2015). Between 1999 and 2004, a number of migration 
and immigrant integration legislation passed in the European Parliament. Broadly speaking, the 
main pieces of legislation included 1) the equal treatment of persons regardless of race or 
ethnicity, 2) third-country nationals’ right to family reunification, and 3) third-country nationals’ 
long-term resident status (Hix 2007, 188-189). Still, immigration rules are not the same in every 
E.U. country, since most E.U. countries have both E.U. and national rules. There are two types of 
E.U.-wide rules: regulations and decisions, and directives. Regulations and decisions are 
legislative acts of the E.U. which are immediately applicable as law in all E.U. countries, with no 
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need for a change in national law. The other type, directives, is more common.  Most E.U.-wide 
immigration rules come from directives. Each member state must incorporate directives into its 
national law by a certain deadline. While the results achieved by directives are binding, 
individual countries can choose the form and methods (EU Immigration Portal: Explaining the 
Rules 2015).  
Thus, significant differences in the national legislation of member states are observable. 
For example, many E.U. member states continue to use national permanent residence permits in 
addition to the European Commission (EC) long-term residence permit. Moreover, member 
states draw a distinction between temporary residence and permanent residence; there is, 
however, no standardized concept of temporary residence.  E.U. law does not regulate many 
areas related to migration, such as the general conditions for residence permits and labor 
migration. Additionally, in the area of family reunification, member states can vary as to who 
they consider to be family outside of the nuclear family (Adam 2009, 13-14). Also, member 
states allow for the admission of third-country nationals for various purposes other than family 
reunification, work and studies and training; E.U. law covers these areas (Adam 2009, 13; 33).   
Liberal and Illiberal Policies of E.U. Member States 
While there is an increased awareness that the E.U. is in need of immigration to support 
its aging population, a trend is visible among some member states towards more restrictive 
immigration policies for non-highly skilled third-country nationals (Adam 2009, 13). Therefore, 
it can be helpful to ask whether the E.U. is in fact liberal when it comes to immigration. As this 
paper stated previously, even though the E.U. is liberal in regards to migration within it, it is not 
necessarily liberal when it comes to migration into it. In fact, according to Liav Orgad of The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, several of the western European countries including 
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Germany, France, and the Netherlands, have pursued illiberal policies of immigration to protect 
their liberal values. Orgad calls this ‘the paradox of liberalism, in which “liberal states, in order 
to preserve what they perceive as a liberal regime, are resorting to illiberal means to guarantee 
liberal values…either the liberal must tolerate illiberal practices, or turn to illiberal means in 
order to ‘liberate’ the illiberal” (Orgad 2010, 92).  
It is important to note that these states direct these illiberal policies mainly  at citizens of 
states they presume to be illiberal or appear to be Muslim (Orgad 2010, 72; 67). One of the more 
recent trends in global migration patterns is that when migrants come to Europe from non-liberal 
societies in Africa and Asia.  Their culture travels with them and it often challenges liberal 
values. Up until the 1950s, migration usually remained within the western world.  Thus, 
immigrants may have been foreigners in their new home states, but they were not strangers to 
western political ideas (Orgad 2010, 57). Immigration to western Europe during the post- Cold 
War era consisted largely of labor migration from the European periphery, but also of 
immigration of workers from former colonies (Castles 1998, 67-68). Today, family reunification 
provides the basis for the vast majority of global migration, including migration to Europe 
(Orgad 2010, 8). The following section attempts to explain the background and the reasoning 
behind these illiberal policies.  
Background and Causes of Migration Policies 
Since the majority of immigrants in Europe in the post-war era were mainly guest 
workers, the policies of immigration differed greatly from the policies in place today. First, these 
policies made labor migration within Europe easier by abolishing borders and inaugurating free 
labor mobility within the various labor markets, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
being the biggest one. When it came to migration of workers outside of the EEC, policies varied 
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greatly depending on the country of emigration and the country of immigration. Some countries, 
both in and outside the E.U., tried to restrict emigration and immigration.  For example, Spain 
and Portugal tried to restrict emigration, while Switzerland and the United Kingdom tried to 
restrict immigration. However, many countries encouraged emigration, such as Japan, Senegal, 
Mali, Mauretania, Morocco, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.  Yet, these countries either had long-range 
plans for attracting back their emigrants when economic conditions warrant their return, or they 
had arrangements with the host country for the emigrants’ return home (Rose 1969, 44-56).  
Temporary or perceived temporary natures characterized these post-Cold War labor 
migrations to western Europe (Orgad 2010, 58). However, after the first migration wave in the 
post-Cold War era, a second migration wave started to become evident in the early 1970s with 
the oil crisis.  The following recession motivated a restructuring of the world economy, involving 
capital investment in new industrial areas, altered patterns of world trade, and the introduction of 
new technologies. The migration patterns to western Europe in this new era consisted of a 
decline of labor migration, and an increase in migration motivated by family reunification.  
However, the E.U. had not envisaged permanent settlement for these foreign workers, and 
generally hoped that these guest workers would return to their country of origin. Initially, 
governments tried to prevent family reunion, but with little success, and eventually family 
reunion was accepted as a human right. Another characteristic of the new migration patterns was 
the development of mass movements of refugees and asylum-seekers, generally moving from 
south to north (Castles 1998, 67; 79-80).  
These two migration waves resulted in significant demographic changes in Europe. The 
settlement process of the migrant workers and their families and the emergence of second and 
third generations born in western Europe led to internal differentiation and the development of 
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community structures and consciousness. These immigrants and their descendants soon became 
clearly visible social groups. Policymakers did not anticipate this development, as they expected 
foreign population to eventually decline. However, the total foreign population of European 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries steadily 
increased since 1980 and was up to nineteen point four million in 1995, and only six point seven 
million people of the total foreign population were E.U. citizens. The rest came mainly from 
North Africa, Turkey, and former Yugoslavia.  Increasingly, workers and asylum-seekers also 
came from countries with economic and political problems, such as countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. Thus, a majority of the foreign populations and the new immigrants were 
from non-European countries, and these groups above all others experienced socioeconomic 
exclusion through discrimination and racism (Castles 1998, 79-81).  
Eastern Europe’s migration history is quite different. Although they did experience 
immigration, it was mainly immigration from states with very similar cultures to their own. The 
main migration flows to eastern and central European countries come from the Ukraine, with 
immigrants being both labor migrants and refugees. In Poland, for example, Ukrainians complete 
many of the jobs within the service sector. With little tradition and experience with dealing with 
refugees from non-European cultures, the eastern and central European states lack the necessary 
infrastructure to handle the problem in a satisfactory and efficient way (Zaborowski 2015). 
While the western states have dealt with immigration both from inside and outside of Europe for 
decades, the eastern and central European states are still ethnically  homogenous, and dealing 
with refugees from outside of Europe is quite a new challenge for them (Zaborowski 2015; Rose 
1969, 44-56).  
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Historically, the eastern European states were also countries of emigration. This remains 
especially true for the states that the E.U. grants membership to, as they can move freely within 
the union. Thus, western Europe is not only facing immigration from the Middle East and North 
Africa, but also from their neighbors in eastern Europe seeking a better life in the west. In fact, in 
eastern Europe emigration is starting to become a problem, as their populations are facing 
serious decline. In the most recent World Population Prospects from the United Nations, the ten 
countries in the world expected to lose the most population between now and 2050, per capita, 
are all in central and eastern Europe. One important reason as to why both eastern Europeans and 
other groups wish to migrate to western Europe is the prospect of living in a more open and 
tolerant society. Some people point out that this is one of the main arguments for not attempting 
to force refugees to settle in the eastern states: they likely will not escape the persecution they are 
fleeing from or find the open and tolerant society they seek.  Eventually, this would cause 
immigrants to migrate to western Europe anyway. Eastern Europe is a place even many eastern 
Europeans are trying to move away from (Lyman 2015).  
Part IV 
Applying Liberal Theories to the Problem of Immigration within the E.U. 
 Before applying liberal theories to the problem of immigration in the E.U., it is necessary 
to reiterate both what these theories are and the E.U’s current immigration practices.  According 
to both classical and contemporary liberal theories, there must be open borders in a liberal 
international system; migration is an individual right that any state’s legitimate mandate cannot 
stop.  The current system involving the Schengen Area within the E.U. is therefore compatible 
with liberal theories.    However, when it comes to outsiders entering the union, there are 
restrictions on immigration.  These restrictions supposedly protect liberal values and E.U. 
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culture—particularly from ‘islamization’— and keep out economic migrants that free-ride on 
welfare systems and ‘take’ jobs.  On the contrary, the E.U. has generally encouraged the 
immigration of highly-skilled third-country nationals. Considering this, only allowing 
immigration of certain groups of people or people of a certain birthplace is definitively not in 
accordance with most liberal theories regarding immigration. 
 According to Carens’ application of Rawls’ theory, if everyone is to have the equal 
opportunity to pursue their goals, open borders are a necessity—where one resides in the world 
has the potential to be of the utmost importance to achieving one’s dreams. However, in the case 
of immigration for the sake of utilizing another society’s welfare system, an immigrant in 
question arguably is imposing on other people’s pursuit of their goals.  
Additionally, immigration can restrict a state’s ability to provide generous welfare for its 
citizens, which Carens argues can be a legitimate reason for restricting immigration (Meilaender 
1999, 1063; 1066).  Any given state’s inhabitants has the potential to spend generations creating 
a society in which forfeiting a small portion of one’s income in order to maintain equal 
opportunity for all is the norm.  By doing so, a state would also automatically create a society 
that guarantees the needy the care they deserve as human beings.   If immigrants enter such a 
society with the goal of reaping the benefits of a generous welfare system, taxes could rise above 
the level the inhabitants had previously agreed to. Furthermore, a government may have to 
designate a larger share of the tax money for this group, leaving other groups suffering. If the 
original goal of the inhabitants of this hypothetical state is to care for its own needy people, 
having immigrants coming and taking a large share of the welfare may limit the pursuits of the 
natives of that state. However, economic migration is justifiable if the goal of any given state is 
to provide social benefits to potential immigrants without asking for anything in return.  
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No E.U. state currently has such a goal. In the 1980s a new phenomenon emerged from 
the prevalent refugee crisis—which was that of asylum seekers—and many of them have since 
then sought to receive protection within Europe. Following the events of 1989-1991, movements 
of asylum seekers from eastern Europe to the west, and increasingly from Africa and Asia as 
well, saw massive increase.  Asylum seekers became the largest entry category in several 
countries, including Germany, France, and Sweden. Many states introduced costly and long-
drawn-out procedures to assess whether such claimants really were victims of persecution, or 
were simply economic migrants (Castles 1998, 88). Since these states clearly had no goal of 
providing economic migrants with social benefits without asking for anything in return, one can 
justify limiting economic immigration according to Carens’ application of Rawls’ theory in this 
case.  
Additionally, John Isbister’s aforementioned liberal argument for restricted immigration 
aligns with this argument. According to Isbister, a state meeting the needs of its own 
disadvantaged citizens before the needs of disadvantaged foreigners is justifiable. He makes the 
argument that one can see the citizens of one’s state as an extended family, and people generally 
give much more attention to one’s kin than to others. This does not mean that one would regard 
one’s kin as morally superior to others, but it could mean that one does not have an obligation to 
provide equal treatment to everyone just because they are morally equal.  Even in rich countries 
there are poor people, and an uncontrolled influx of poor people might worsen the conditions of 
the poor in said rich countries (Isbister 2000, 630-634).  
Currently, in Sweden, the E.U. member state with the most generous immigration 
policies, the population is experiencing tax increases as a result of immigration. The social 
services that the municipalities and regional governments provide, such as healthcare, dental 
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care, schooling, and child care, are taking a serious hit.  Less resources can go to social services 
because the Swedish government is instead allocating resources towards care for immigrants. 
Many municipalities are currently struggling to provide social benefits to the people entitled to 
them, and this has resulted in the previously mentioned tax increases. Through 2019, the average 
household faces an estimated tax increase of about 1700 U.S. dollars per year (Gudmundson 
2015). If the immigrants coming into Sweden were economic migrants, one could make a liberal 
argument for restricting immigration. However, Sweden considers most of the immigrants in 
question refugees, and granting this group asylum is compatible with most liberal theories. Since 
these immigrants are truly fleeing poor circumstances and seek to better their lives, they are 
expressing an individual right according to liberal migration theories. Additionally, under the 
1951 Refugee Convention and a string of E.U. laws, European countries must offer refuge or 
other types of protection to asylum-seekers who can demonstrate that they are fleeing war or 
persecution (The History of the European Union 2015).  
However, there is a widespread belief, especially among eastern European states, that the 
“overwhelming majority” of immigrants in Europe are not refugees, but economic migrants (N. 
2015). It can be difficult to determine which category a migrant belongs to, which poses 
difficulties both for the states of immigration, as well as the genuine refugees (Castles 1998, 8-
89). It is also tricky to capture the complex motives behind migrants’ journeys, and there could 
very well be a mixture of motives making a migrant both a refugee and an economic migrant (N. 
2015). If a state has valid reasons to believe that a majority of immigrants to their state only are 
there to reap the benefits of a generous social welfare system, they can justify limiting 
immigration from this group. However, when such a state is part of a union so integrated as the 
European Union, it poses a problem because the policies of one state can affect other member 
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states. Once a migrant has entered the Schengen Area, for example, they can simply migrate to a 
state with more generous asylum policies if their first attempt fails. Such a system will eventually 
lead to an unequal sharing of the burden between member states.  The real question lies in 
whether or not something should be done about it.  
According to liberal theories about migration, an individual must have the opportunity to 
migrate wherever they want in order to pursue their goals, unless it infringes upon another’s 
ability to do the same (Meilaender 1999, 1063; 1066). Therefore, a government cannot force a 
migrant to migrate to a certain country; the destination of their migration must be their choice, 
and their choice only. At the same time, the E.U. cannot force a state to accept the immigrants it 
does not wish to accommodate according to the liberal principle of non-intervention (Doyle 
2008, 67). One can argue that the more generous states should also restrict immigration if they 
do not wish to carry such a heavy burden.  
However, being part of a union such as the E.U. means that the minority must follow 
whatever the majority decision is.  In the application of Lockean theories in this situation, the 
duties of natural law—life, liberty, and property—govern statespersons and citizens alike. 
Mutual trust under the law therefore distinguish Lockean states.  In the literature explaining the 
logic of negotiation, trust is crucial for stable agreements (Doyle 2008, 60). Thus, if the E.U. was 
to impose a quota system which designates a certain number of immigrants to each member 
state, it is important that even reluctant member states follow the rules. Otherwise, the entire 
system would collapse. Yet, this way of operating can only justify forcing member states to 
accommodate immigrants.  It does not justify forcing immigrants to live in a state in which they 
do not wish to live. In order for the E.U. to remain liberal, it must cease to adhere to illiberal 
policies like these ones.  
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Still, nationally, both eastern European and western European states pursue illiberal 
immigration policies. For example, Hungary has a history of strong nationalistic domestic and 
foreign policies.  The Hungarian nation has between two and a half million and five million 
citizens outside its national borders, and its policies are designed so that these Hungarians can 
receive support from the Hungarian state.  Its foreign policies encourage them to resettle in 
Hungary. However, Hungary does not encourage immigrants from other nations specifically, and 
perceives a rise in the population of non-Hungarians as the demise of Hungarian cultural 
influence. Hungary is keen that traditionally ethnic Hungarian territories remain populated with 
Hungarians as a means to ensure the continuation of Hungarian culture and national identity 
(Butler 2007, 1115-1125).  
Although the argument posed by Isbister about seeing one’s own nation as an extended 
family, thus justifying seeing to the needs of one’s own disadvantaged citizens before seeing to 
the needs of disadvantaged foreigners, limited immigration is not justifiable in this case.  Both 
Carens and Isbister agree that immigration restrictions based on protecting a nation’s own people 
in order to privilege them is both selfish and highly illiberal. Thus, one can construe the pursuit 
of the Hungarian people to deny immigrants the right to enter Hungary for the sake of protecting 
Hungarian culture as selfish and illiberal.  
In some western European countries ‘the paradox of liberalism’ prevails as they seek to 
remain liberal societies by resorting to illiberal means. The cultures of immigrant states and the 
cultures of the immigrants are currently clashing. Illiberal practices across Europe have emerged, 
such as female genital mutilation, honor killings, and forced marriages. Additionally, opinion 
polls have revealed that native Europeans and immigrants, especially of Muslim origin, often 
espouse different values and lifestyles. Finally, immigrants and minorities are increasingly 
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challenging the authority of European institutions. Some see this as a collision between tradition 
and modernity, and many Europeans feel that immigration may threaten liberalism and western 
culture (Orgad 2010, 59-62).  
In order to address these perceived threats, states such as Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark have introduced policies to determine how compatible a potential immigrant is with 
western society. Germany, for example, has introduced tests that immigrants must pass in order 
to become German citizens.  These tests include questions about gender equality, religion, 
politics, and culture. (Orgad 2010, 66-67). The Danes conduct a similar test, in which a potential 
immigrant must answer questions about Danish culture and history, as well as questions about 
abortion, equality, and freedom of speech (Orgad 2010, 79-80). The Dutch have revived the 
concept of ‘imburgering,’ which aims at making immigrants become like the native Dutch.  In 
order to become Dutch, an immigrant must therefore subscribe to Dutch values (Orgad 2010, 70-
71). 
These policies aim at liberating people who are perceived illiberal.  However, forcing 
someone to adhere to a certain lifestyle or certain values is not in accordance with liberal 
theories, as it limits the individual in their private pursuits.  Both Locke and Nozick argue that 
these pursuits are essential to liberalism.  
Conclusion 
History and experience with immigration have influenced the varying degrees of liberal 
policies within the E.U. regarding immigration. Many western European states have decades of 
experience of dealing with immigration from non-western states, while eastern European states 
traditionally are countries of emigration. Strong nationalistic sentiments and the aspiration to 
preserve their own culture, such as in Hungary, have created more illiberal immigration policies. 
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Both eastern and western European states perceive threats from non-western—particularly 
Islamic—cultures, which they believe will eventually undermine western liberal cultures and 
values. This also contributes to restrictions on immigration, particularly in eastern European 
countries. Additionally, E.U. legislation permits member states to have varying legislation 
regarding immigration, although there are certain rules and directives that all members must 
follow. 
These varying policies contribute to divisions within the E.U. regarding where 
immigrants reside. Not only are many western European countries housing first, second, and 
third generation immigrants, but they are also housing immigrants from eastern Europe, who can 
move easily within Europe as members of the E.U.  Additionally, the recent increase of 
immigrants to the E.U. from Syria, other Middle Eastern countries, and North Africa has placed 
pressure on western European states to accommodate immigrants.  The E.U. has proposed a 
quota system in an attempt to relieve the pressure on western Europe and the E.U. states on the 
eastern frontiers.  Many eastern states find this quota unsatisfactory.  
With this effect, many have had doubts as to the degree to which the E.U. can be a liberal 
community regarding immigration. Although it is liberal in terms of migration within it, it is not 
necessarily liberal when it comes to migration into it. The recent migration crisis has further 
strained both the ability and the desire of member states to be liberal. Although some member 
states seek to be accommodative, they start to lack the economic means to provide for 
immigrants. Others have pursued illiberal immigration policies for years in order to ensure the 
preservation of their liberal values. A third category has resented immigration from non-western 
societies from the very beginning.  
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If the E.U. wishes to be a liberal community it must cease to pursue illiberal practices and 
open up its external borders. However, in doing so, member states must unevenly share the 
burden of immigration, because the fact remains that not only are eastern states reluctant to 
accept immigrants from non-western societies, but these immigrants are also reluctant to settle 
down in eastern European states. There, they may simply not escape the persecution that they are 
fleeing, and they may not find the open and tolerant society they seek, ultimately leading 
immigrants settling in western Europe anyway. Because a large part of the immigrants are 
coming from non-western societies, assimilation and integration into a western society might 
take some time. However, if the E.U. seeks to be a truly liberal community, it cannot resort to 
illiberal means to speed up this process.  
Studies have shown that second generation, primarily Muslim, immigrants tend to 
become radicalized (Laqueur 2004). The large amount of immigrants with a Muslim background 
that have recently come to Europe has resulted in a clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993, 309-
310). Others argue it is a clash between tradition and modernity, and a third group argues that it 
is a clash between radical liberalism and radical religion (Orgad 2010, 61-62). However one puts 
it, it is a fact that serious divisions between the native population and the increasing Muslim 
population have developed over the years. Divisions between the E.U. member states have also 
developed as a result of differing policies regarding immigration, as well as over other issues, 
such as a shaky economy and the implications of having a common currency. The E.U. might 
risk imploding unless it stops attempting to do more than it can handle. It already has internal 
crises such as terrorism, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Eurozone sovereign debt, Britain’s future 
in the E.U., Greece’s future in the Eurozone, and the Portuguese constitutional crisis (Kaplan 
2014; Münchau 2015).  
23 
 
All this implies that if the E.U. is to survive, it needs to deal with its own problems before 
dealing with those of others. Although the aging continent is in desperate need for immigrants, 
there clearly is a limit to what it can handle at the moment. This is not the time for the E.U. to be 
a liberal community when it comes to immigration. This is the time for the E.U. to take a step 
back in its liberal pursuits and impose stricter border controls in order to avoid economic 
migrants entering into the union.  It should also impose a more extensive quota system to more 
efficiently provide for the refugees. Additionally, imposing demands on the immigrants, such as 
language proficiency and respect for the native culture, is permissible if it benefits the integration 
process. Of course, the E.U. should conduct this in such a way that democratic rights go 
unviolated. Having a somewhat illiberal E.U. today for the prospect of having a fully liberal E.U. 
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